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RECENT CASES
WmLs-L'E ESTATE WrrI-I PLIm Pownn TO ENcRtoACE-Testator's
will provided in part as follows:
[I] hereby give and bequeath to my beloved wife, Susie
Alice Dennis, all of my property, personal, real and mixed to be used
by her during her natural life and at her death the remainder to be
invested and the proceeds to go to the upkeep of the Choateville
Cemetery ...
His widow, to whom he was married for many years, was his sole sur-
vivor, and his estate consisted of a house and lot, furniture and personal
effects. Nine years after testator's death, his widow sought a declara-
tion of rights, alleging dire need and claiming that the will gave her
a life estate with the right to encroach upon and use such of the
property as might be reasonably necessary for her comfort and sup-
port. The lower court held she received only a bare life estate with
no power to invade the principal for any purpose. Held: Reversed.
The will conferred a power to encroach, including the power to dis-
pose of the real estate, where such encroachment was necessary to
the life tenant's reasonable and comfortable support. Dennis v. Trus-
tees of Choateville Christian Church, 290 S.W. 2d 601 (Ky. 1956).
As in most will cases, the decision here purports to turn on an in-
terpretation of the phraseology used in the instrument. Since the
primary objective was the usual one of giving effect to the intention of
testator as gathered from the express language of the whole instru-
ment,' considering certain circumstances attendant at its execution,
2
the finding of the court in the instant case is most difficult to reconcile
with the relevant Kentucky decisions. Indeed, it would be unrealistic
to attempt to evaluate the court's holding solely upon doctrinal
grounds and without consideration of factors apart from the testa-
mentary language which may have been influential.
In the final analysis, testators language in the principal case
presents this basic question for decision: Did he intend to give his
wife a bare life estate with an ordinary remainder over in the whole
estate or did he intend to give her a consuming life estate with a
remnant remainder over in what might remain at her death? The
first alternative is the normal interpretation where testator uses no
words expressly conferring a right to use or dispose on the first taker.
The second result is a permissible interpretation in Kentucky if the will
' Trustees Presbyterian Church of Somerset v. Mize, 181 Ky. 567, 205 S.W.
674, 2 A.L.R. 1237 (1918), states that the intention of testator must be ascertained
from the entire will, either from its express words or the necessary inferences
resulting from their use; Anderson v. Hall, 80 Ky. 91 (1882); Price v. Price, 298
Ky. 608, 183 S.W. 2d 652 (1944).
2 33 Am. Jur. 724 (1941).
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as a whole contains language from which a limited power to consume
can be reasonably inferred. The latter interpretation is followed most
frequently in construing wills where the estate of the first taker is not
expressly identified as a life estate. The classic testamentary language
which results in the creation of a true remnant gift over is found in
Hanks v. McDanell3 where the instrument gave testator's property to
his wife:
[T]o be used, enjoyed and disposed of by her in any way she may
choose with this provision however-that, should any of said property
... remain at the death of my said wife, the same shall [go over]
An analysis of the remnant gift over as a future interest and an evalua-
tion of comparatively recent Kentucky cases has been made else-
where.6
In adopting the interpretation that testator intended to give his
wife a consuming life estate with remnant remainder over, the court
pointed out that if he had intended a mere life estate he would have
devised the property for "her natural life," but he added the words:
"to be used by her." The court said that "to use" means, in the
dictionary sense, "to consume";6 however, cases cited in the opinion
as so interpreting the word when employed in wills do not appear,
upon a closer examination, to support such a meaning.7 Admitting
3 307 Ky. 243, 210 S.W. 2d 784, 17 A.L.R. 2d 1 (1948).
4 Id. 210 S.W. 2d at 785. Here the language was broad enough to imply
an unlimited power of disposal, but the court concluded that a life estate was
devised coupled with the limited power to consume inter vivos. Such a holding
follows, at least by implication, the unanimous refusal of courts to sustain a gift
-over if testator clearly intended to confer absolute ownership on the first taker in
the form of a fee simple estate. Instead of completely iporing the probable
intention of testator, however, the courts award his widow 'the next best thing"
by interpreting the gift over as a remainder in the remnant of the estate, in-
dicating that testator 'meant" to create a life estate with the power to encroach.
5 Matthews, Remnant Gifts Over in Kentucky, 44 Ky. L.J. 397 (1956). See
also Norvell, The Power to Consume: Estate Plan or Estate Confusion, 28 Mich.
State B.J. 5 (1949); 4 Simes & Smith, Law of Future Interests 67-70 (1956);
Collings v. Collings' Ex'rs., 260 S.W. 2d 935 (Ky. 1953) (a good general sum-
mary of the Court s view of the remnant gift over). For the latest Kentucky case
on the general subject, see McKee v. Hedges, 297 S.W. 2d 45 (Ky. 1957).
6 The court quotes from Webster's New International Dictionary, Second
Edition, where "use" is defined as: "To convert to one's service; to avail oneself of;
to consume."
7The court cites Miller, Com'r of Finance v. Franklin County, 802 Ky. 652,
195 S.W. 2d 315 (1946), which construes the word "use," in a statute requiring
seized gambling devices to be "forfeited to the use of the state," as meaning
"absolute appropriation." But, as pointed out by appellees' brief, the Miller case
is merely an interpretation of the intention of the legislature in regard to that
particular statute. The court, however, quotes the Miller case as follows: "We
have frequently ...determined [the word use as meaning "the absolute in-
vestiture of title']. . . . One of the late cases, so determining, is Hopkins v.
Howard's Exr'x., 266 Ky. 685, 99 S W. 2d 810 (1936). In that opinion we
quoted from the prior case of Rice v. Fields, 192 Ky. 161, 232 S.W. 385 (1921)."
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that the word "use" in the proper context may have some remnant gift
connotation, the usual definition of the word in the cases means some-
thing less than "consume," and much stronger language should be
required to imply an intention to augment a bare life estate. 8 More-
over, it is difficult and unrealistic to determine the first takers interest
apart from the words used to create the future interest, since the
nature of both interests is governed by the language of the entire will.
Where, as here, a life estate clearly is created but the power of the
life tenant to consume is inconclusively expressed, the nature of the
remainder over probably is the controlling factor as to the existence
of the power. The court said that if anything be needed to strengthen
the conclusion that a consuming life estate was devised, it was the
disposition of "the remainder," a "plain indication" that testator con-
templated a diminution of the corpus during the immediate bene-
ficiary's lifetime.9 This conclusion is a non sequitur in the writer's
opinion. The word "remainder" is the customary expression for cre-
ating a vested estate following the creation of a life or lesser estate.10
But these cases do not support such a comprehensive meaning. The will in the
Hopkins' case read in part: "I will to my wife .. . all of my personal property
of evey kind for her use and control during her life.. ." and the court held that
the widow merely took a life estate without the right to consume. The will in the
Rice case devised real and personal property to the widow "to be held and con-
trolled and used by her for any purpose that she might see fit, during her natural
life time." The court held that a life estate only was created, that there was no
express power to sell or give the property away unless by the use of the words
"held," "controlled," and "used." It was agreed that these three words did not
invest the widow with any power of disposition other than might incidentally
appertain to a reasonable use, and that the only property subject to destruction
would be that personal property subject to destruction by use. Cf. Martin v. Barn-
hill, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1666, 56 S.W. 160 (1900).8 See, for example: Davison's Adm. v. Davison's Adm., 149 Ky. 571, 149
S.W. 982 (1912); Wright v. Singleton, 190 Ky. 657, 228 S.W. 88 (1920); Shirley
v. Graham, 201 Ky. 339, 256 S.W. 718 (1923). 33 Am. Jur. at 727 states that
there are usually additional words where the power is implied, and that "use" is
a word of partial dominion and in several cases has been held not to grant any
power of consumption. The writer submits, also, that it makes some difference
whether the word is employed as a noun, i.e., "the use," or as a verb, i.e., "to
use," since the former is clearly a "weaker" word.
9 The court cites only Weller v. Dinwiddie, 198 Ky. 360, 248 S.W. 874
(1923), which defines "remainder" in the dictionary sense: "A portion of a thin,
remaining or left at the separation and removal of a part; remnant; residue,'
Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition. But see infra note 10.
Although the court states that it is 'evident" that testator's expressions should
be given their "ordinary, everyday meaning," it should be noted that the will in
the instant case was typewritten and properly attested to and witnessed, and
appellees contended that the will was lawyer-drawn. See also, 33 Am. Jur. 725
(1941), which points out that the nature of the property is a factor in determining
whether a power to dispose is intended, since the inference is stronger where the
subject of the gift is not consumable.
" 1 The Weller case, supra note 9, also states the common legal definition of
"remainder": "[W]hat is left of the entire estate . . .after a preceding part has
been disposed of, and whose regular termination the remainderman must await."
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Virtually all of the cases clearly show that the usual language for in-
dicating a remnant gift over includes such expressions as "if anything
be left," "whatever may remain", "the remainder, if any", and equiva-
lent phrases.'
The court could have properly disposed of the instant case by fol-
lowing its decision in Taylor v. Taylor.12 There the widow was devised
property "to have during her life . . . and at her death . . . the re-
mainder" over. It was held, following Weller v. Dinwiddie,'3 that
"remainder" was sometimes used in the sense of meaning what is
not consumed, but that in such a case the entire will must manifest a
purpose to give the life tenant the right to encroach. It was also
pointed out that a previous case14 had determined that the words "to
have and use" clearly expressed no larger interest in the first taker
than a bare life estate. If the widow had received the property to be
used for life, the remainder, if any, over, it might be possible to justify
the court's interpretation. Or if the first taker's interest had been
clearly delineated as a consuming life estate, "the remainder" over
would not reduce the estate intended.1 But these additional words
were not written by the testator. In the writer's opinion, therefore,
the court implied the power to consume where there was a remainder
over of the whole estate following a bare life interest. The incongruity
of such a decision is evident when it is considered that previously the
power to consume has only been implied where there was a remainder
over of the remnant of the estate or where testator's words reasonably
manifested a right to encroach upon the life estate.
Whether the power to consume is express or implied, the extent of
such power presents a second interpretation question and the answer
must be found in the language of the instrument. It was determined
in the instant case that the implied power could be exercised only for
the reasonable support and maintenance of the appellant. In specify-
ing this limitation, the court followed Presbyterian Church of Somerset
v. Mize.16 In this leading case it was decided that where there is no
express power of disposition, but such a power is necessarily implied
11 Trustees Presbyterian Church of Somerset v. Mize, supra note 1; Clore v.
Clore, 184 Ky. 83, 211 S.W. 208 (1919); Cottrell v. Cottrel, 305 Ky. 663, 205
S.W. 2d 312 (1947); Hanks v. McDanell, supra note 3; Jacob v. Barnard 307
Ky. 321, 210 S.W. 2d 972 (1948); Swango v. Swango's Adm'r., 313 Ky. 4 95, 232
S.W. 2d 347 (1950). For a compilation of cases involving the remnant gift over,
see 17 A.L.R. 2d 1 (1950).
12 266 Ky. 375, 99 S.W. 2d 201 (1936). See also Davison's Adm. v. Davison's
Adm., supra note 8.
13 Supra notes 9 and 10.
14 Shirley v. Graham, supra note 8.
'5 See Weakley v. Weakley, 237 S.W. 2d 524 (Ky. 1951); Matthews, supra
note 5 at 421-423.
16 Supra note 1.
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from the terms of the will, the life tenant cannot waste the estate nor
give it away nor dispose of it except for his own necessary support.
The rule has thus evolved that the implied power of disposal is not
unlimited. The first taker may not dispose of the corpus by inter vivos
gift or by will.17 But where there is a bona fide need, the life tenant
may dispose of the principal and destroy the interest of remainder-
men.'
8
Up to this point the application of the accepted rules of interpreta-
tion has been discussed. But this is not the whole story. To fully
understand and evaluate cases where the courts must construe the
nature of the first taker's interest from ambiguous expressions of in-
tent, there are factors apart from the testamentary language which
should be considered. For instance, the identity of the parties to the
action may be influential. Most of the cases involve a determination
of the interests of the widow or her devisees or heirs and the remainder-
men or heirs of the husband, and there is some evidence that the
court is more objective in its construction where the interests of the
spouse are directly involved. Where the widow is a party, the existence
or extent of her need may be another important factor. If she is
impecunious and infirm, her "appeal" is correspondingly increased,
and if she seeks to consume the property, the court's interpretation of
the instrument may vary depending on whether her motive is to secure
necessary support and maintenance or merely a profitable bargain.
It is important to notice what the court does under given circum-
stances as well as what it says. In about two-thirds of the cases in-
volving a construction of the widow's interest she was awarded a life
estate with the power to encroach. In those cases where the widow's
interest was construed as a mere life estate, only one true hardship
resulted. In the others, the widow was not described as indigent but
was attempting to dispose of the corpus as the fee owner or was simply
asking for a construction of the instrument in order to clarify her rights
thereunder.
In only a few cases, including the principal case, did the widow
ask for an interpretation defining her interest as less than a fee simple.
The remainderman, on the other hand, consistently alleged that the
widow had acquired a bare life estate. In this situation, it might be
17 The power to encroach necessarily implies the power to sell or mortgage
the property. 2 A.L.R. at 1268 (1919).
18 The question inevitably arises in such cases as to whether the court or the
life beneficiary, herself, should be the judge of her need. Hisman v. Willett, 32
Ky. L. Rep. 906, 107 S.W. 334 (1908); Maynard v. Raines, 240 Ky. 614, 42 S.W.
2d 873 (1931). See also 2 Woerner, American Law of Administration 1144-1145
(1923).
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said that the court is faced with a "doctrinal question": under the
terms of the will, how much can be given the widow without com-
pletely destroying the attempted gift over? If the widow is given a
fee, the remnant gift provision is invalidated. If it is decided that
she has a life estate with a power to encroach upon the principal,
however, the gift over is doctrinally preserved. From a practical, as
well as a legal point of view, the power to encroach must be limited
so that the remainder is not wholly consumed except to meet the
devisee's dire need. Therefore, in a case where the widow needs to
encroach upon the corpus for her support, she can be protected with-
out destroying the remnant gift over ff the language of the instrument
permits the court to construe a life estate with the limited power to
encroach.
The possible influence of these various factors is illustrated in
Cottrell v. Cottrell,19 a 1947 Kentucky case. Testator's will stated: "I
give, bequeath and devise all my estate.., to my wife. .. ." Upon her
death a payment was to be made to certain devisees, and after this
payment testator devised "Whatever the remainder. . ., if any, to my
brother." As in the principal case, the widow was an invalid and
desired a life estate with the power to encroach for her necessary sup-
port and to pay certain of testator's debts. The court, in giving the
widow the benefit of the doubt, noted that it "would be a presumption
against human nature to conclude other than that testator was doing
his best to provide for the care and comfort of his wife." In such cases,
the court answers the "doctrinal question" as to what aid can be given
the widow without destroying the gift over by interpreting her interest
as a life estate with the limited power to consume. In Embry's Ex'x v.
Embry's Devisees,20 the widow claimed an unrestricted life estate from
the language: "do with [my property] as she may please during her
life, and at her death if there is anything remaining . . ." it shall go
over. The court interpreted the language as creating neither a fee nor
a mere life estate, but a life estate with the power to encroach for sup-
port. The court thus assured the widow a measure of free use and
management of the property during her life, but guarded the gift over
from indiscriminate consumption.
Compare the testamentary language in the Cottrell case and in the
principal case to the following:
[1] .. . bequeath all [my property] . . . unto my beloved
wife... to her and for her absolute use and benefits while she lives.
. 21 [There was no remainder clause].
19 Supra note 11.
2031 Ky. L. Rep. 295, 102 S.W. 239 (1907). See Hickman v. Moore, 160
Ky. 474, 169 S.W. 827 (1914). 21 Wright v. Singleton, supra note 8.
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I desire to bequeath to my wife . . . all of my property . . . to be
held and controlled by her and used by her for any purpose that she
may see fit, during her natural life time, after her death, I desire
that whatever may remain of my estate. .... [shall be distributed].
22
[I] give [all my property] . . . to my beloved wife . . .
to be held, used and enjoyed by her during her natural life ...
After [her] death . . . I give . . . all the remainder . . . to my
children ... 23
The court construed all these clauses as creating a life estate with no
power to invade the principal for any reason. It may be significant
that in none of the above cases was a needy widow suing for a
power to consume the property for her reasonable and necessary sup-
port. In the first case the widow desired to dispose of the property as
the fee owner thereof, not for maintenance but solely for profit and
gain. In the second case the widow, claiming a fee title, had im-
petuously conveyed the property, and the suit was between the testa-
tor's heirs and the vendee of the widow. In the latter action, the widow
was deceased, and her devisees and testator's remaindermen were the
interested parties.
The court has vigorously denied any nondoctrinal approach to the
solution of these cases. In Shirley v. Graham,24 the court defended the
basic principle that only the testators intention as expressed in the
instrument should control. In that case, as here, the widow was a con-
firmed invalid and the income from her estate was insufficient to pro-
vide for her adequate support. The court disavowed any authority to
take care of the unforeseen by disregarding the testator's language
upon the presumption of what he would have wanted. The testator
undoubtedly intended to provide for his wife's needs, but he decided
how he wanted it done-by a life estate. The prescribed means, said
the court, should not be disregarded in order to accomplish an as-
sumed or expressed purpose. Whether the court has always followed
the principles enunciated in this case may be open to conjecture.
In the principal case the court was faced with the plea of an aged
and infirm widow, sorely in need of a power to invade the corpus of
the modest estate for her essential needs. Balanced against her in-
terests were the contentions of the trustees of the Choateville Church
that the corpus should remain intact so that the testator's intention to
provide for the future upkeep of the Church cemetery could be
realized. One suspects that the court was probably as keenly aware
of the immediate plight of the widow as it was of the words contained
within the four corners of the instrument. Certainly counsel for the
appellant understood the possible influence of these extrinsic factors
2 2 Rice v. Fields, supra note 7.
23 Davison's Adm. v. Davison's Adm., supra note 8. 24 Supra note 8.
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when he carefully pointed out in his brief that if the construction
placed upon the will by the lower court prevailed, the appellant
would become a public charge, a result which the testator could never
have intended. After reversal, appellees, in their petition for a rehear-
ing, urged that, notwithstanding the need of the widow and the natural
sympathy for her, the court should adhere to the guiding light of con-
struction, the expressed intention of the testator.2 5 The writer submits
that in the principal case the status of the widow, her need for care
and maintenance, may have overcome the apparent intention of the
testator to create a mere life estate without the additional power to
encroach.
26
The value of the proper implication of the power to consume is
unquestioned. In the first place, while the consuming life estate is not
suited to a large, complex estate, it can be employed quite effectively
where the estate is a modest one and the remainderman is closely as-
sociated with the first taker.2 7 Secondly, as long as there are homemade
wills the implied power may be the only way to accomodate the
testator who, recognizing that a mere life estate may prove insufficient
for his widow's comfortable support, attempts to give her almost a fee
while controlling subsequent devolution.
In Kentucky, as in most states, every will lacking explicit directions
must be litigated, and fine distinctions are often drawn as to the mean-
ing of almost identical provisions. The draftsman learns from this
case that he should not too generously phrase the first taker's interest
if he only intends to draft an ordinary life estate. If the testator here
had given his wife the property "during her natural life and at her
death the remainder" over, there could be little doubt that a bare life
estate was created. But the addition of the words "to be used" permit
the court to imply the power to encroach, even though most authori-
ties would probably consider the words as mere surplusage. In short,
there is little, if anything, in the language of the instant will indicating
the testator's intention that his widow should have the power to
consume. Leslie W. Morris II
25 In their original brief, the appellees betrayed a knowledge of the "un-
popularity" of their position when they cautioned the court not to assume that the
upkeep of the small cemetery named as remainderman was not of relative im-
portance to testator. It was pointed out that it was only for testator to know
how much the maintenance of the cemetery meant to him.
26 For a short note on this general subject, see 31 Can. Bar Rev. 1041 (1953).
This article comments upon a "refreshing" wills case where the judge "went
directly to the fundamentals of the problem without allowing himself to be side-
trackea by a literal application of one or two rules of construction." It is noted
that these rules are designed to ferret out testator's intent, but too often are ap-
plied literally to defeat his real intention. By "intent" here is meant not only
testator's positively indicated intent, but that which he would have apparently
formed had the problem been passed to him.
27 See Matthews, supra note 5; Norvell, supra note 5.
